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The article has two objectives. The ﬁrst one is to identify the distinctive features of the Polish trans-
formation, especially those which may explain why the initial, transformational recession was less
serious than elsewhere and why the subsequent economic growth was relatively high. It discusses
positive as well as negative effects of the transition to the market-based economy. Some popular
extremely negative evaluations of the transition are argued to be at variance with facts. The other
objective is to discuss the reforms and policies necessary for Poland to continue the process of catching
up with the most advanced countries, so that the civilisation gap is further bridged or possibly
eliminated.1. Introduction
The transformation of the economic and social system in Poland
and other Central European and former USSR countries began
when both the governed and governors of these countries almost
commonly accepted that the economic system based on central
management and state ownership lost in the competition with the
system based on private property and individual entrepreneurship,
market competition, coordinating role of prices and regulatory role
of law.
In this way, the biggest experiment of the 20th century which
tested in practice the quality and social usefulness of two globally
dominating, and completely different, economic theories has come
to an end.
In 1989 the level of macroeconomic destabilisation of the Polish
economy was much bigger than that of the economies of other
countries of real socialism. It was only Poland that did not service
majority of its foreign debt and only in Poland inﬂation approached
the hyperinﬂation level, undermining the conﬁdence of citizens to
its own currency so seriously that in August 1989 the average
monthly pay, according to the market exchange rate, declined to 20
US dollars.
In this situation, the restoration of a sustainable macroeconomic
equilibrium had to become an urgent priority goal.
The reformers' second key goal was to fully liberalise prices and
foreign trade so as to promptly get rid of shortages and queues. Innk of the Republic of Turkey.
urkey. Production and hosting bythe new economic system the prices of products and services were
to play an important informational role about the real production
costs. Thus, they had to be free from severe deformation made by
large subsidies and product speciﬁc taxes.
The third key goal was to restore the development capacity of
the economy to a level enabling Poland the start of a process of
gradual bridging, and in a few decades possibly the elimination, of a
serious and long-lasting civilisation gap in relation to Western
Europe that has arisen in the past few centuries.
Statistical data show that already during the ﬁrst few years of
transformation Poland, to a large extent, managed to achieve these
three goals.
2. The impact of collapse of the former economic system on
the course of transformation
The scholarly literature points to a great similarity of economic
systems in nearly all countries of real socialism and to large dif-
ferences in the ways the transformation was conducted in the
Central European countries and the former USSR on the one hand
and in China on the other.
One of these differences resulted from the fact that in all the
countries but China big systemic reforms were adopted after a few
decades of change suppression, but when they ﬁnally began, they
were fast and in majority of cases radical. In China big systemic
changes began in 1979, i.e. 10 years earlier, but they were limited
almost entirely to the economic area and except for the initial
revolutionary liquidation of communes have been gradual in the
last 35 years. The second important difference concerns the stateElsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
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China was to a large extent subordinated to the achievement of a
very rapid economic growth, and also a very high employment
growth rate.
However, despite these differences in the course of trans-
formation, the basic systemic reforms were conducted in all
countries in response to serious economic failures. In China it was
the so-called Cultural Revolution, which lasted for 6 years and was
quite destructive. In the USSR and Central Europe it was a signiﬁ-
cant economic growth slowdown which began about 1975, mass
shortages on the domestic market as well as a growing inﬂation
pressure. In Poland it was also a deep recession in the period
1980e1981 and a formal bankruptcy in the foreign ﬁnancial re-
lations from 1981.
A low level of urbanisation in China enabled the authorities to
isolate the economic from political reforms. Inefﬁcient communal
agriculture and a dynamic population growth forced the authorities
to shift to individual farming already at the end of the 1970s. In
much more developed countries of the former USSR and Central
Europe the strategy of maintaining a high degree of state control
over the economy meant that the social and economic crisis had to
become critical to force the authorities to accept the overall
transformation of the economic system. However, in the meantime
the structural deformation of economies in these countries went
very far.
In such circumstances, a fast introduction of market prices
together with the elimination of most subsidies and the liberali-
sation of imports and exports meant a rapid and deep change in the
composition of the domestic demand, particularly a considerable
decline in the demand for a large number of goods produced
domestically. And the collapse of the CMEA trading bloc and a shift
to world prices necessitated a quick and in-depth reorientation of
foreign trade. Moreover, in the former Soviet Union there was a big
decline in its well-developed and large armaments manufacturing.
In this situation, from the Elbe to Kamchatka the industrial output
had to decline, in certain cases very considerably, giving rise to the
so-called transformational recession (Kornai, 1994; Gomulka and
Lane, 2001).
Transformational recession, measured in percentages of the
decline in industrial output or the whole GDP in the transformation
ﬁrst few years, was smaller in Poland than elsewhere (apart from
Slovenia). Also the Polish economy regained its growth capacity
sooner than others. Why did it? The extensive literature does not
offer a satisfactory theoretical explanation of these two phenom-
ena. The authors (for example Blanchard, 1997; Gomulka, 1998)
point to a positive role of reforms before 1989, as a result of which
the private sector in 1989 represented a much bigger share in the
economy than elsewhere, and to more profound liberalising re-
forms in the initial period of transformation, which resulted in an
extremely dynamic growth of the new private sector.
3. General evaluation of the 25-year period. What are the
effects of the economic transformation?
Economists are primarily interested in the indicator of the
relative economic level, measured in terms of GDP per capita as a
percentage of GDP per capita in the most developed countries. In
1992e2013 GDP per capita in Poland grew twice as fast as in the
most developed EU countries. As a consequence, this indicator of
the relative level of the Polish economy grew from about 30% in
1988 up to about 50% in 2013. Table 1 shows the relative eco-
nomic level data with reference to the USA for all the countries
which went through the social and economic transformation,
also for Germany at the beginning and end of the transformation
period.For Poland in 2014 the level of the former Federal Republic of
Germany or southern England, not to mention the United States, is
still very distant. The country is at the level of Hungary and Greece,
and is approaching the level of Portugal. However, the improve-
ment in the relative economic level indicator is so large that it
justiﬁes to call the period of the last 25 years a golden quarter
century of the last three centuries of the Polish history. This positive
assessment is based on GDP per capita, but it may be additionally
supported by data on a substantial improvement in ecological in-
dicators, much improved access of households and companies to
the latest technologies for processing information, mass scale of
travelling of Poles all over the world and a rise of life expectancy by
about 10%. In recent years the quality of housing and public infra-
structure has also been much improved. All these mean a sub-
stantial progress in bridging the civilisation gap in relation to the
world's best developed countries.4. Issues which raise argument in public debate on economic
transformation
The publicly circulated evaluation of the Polish transformation
has always been and still is much diversiﬁed. Some critical ap-
proaches concern important questions and are well-documented.
Thus, on about 1/3 of the Polish territory, that less urbanised, the
unemployment rate is excessive, often amounting to more than
20%.
As a consequence, labour migration has been considerable; the
number of emigrants is presently estimated to be about 2 million,
or about 10% of the potential labour force. In several important
areas, such as health service, public administration, higher educa-
tion as well as basic research and innovative activity, the progress is
notable but the distance to well developed countries still remains
substantial.
The level of diversiﬁcation of incomes and wealth per capita is
not as dramatically big as for example in China, Russia or the United
States, but the scope of poverty is conspicuous. In 2013, according
to data published recently by GUS (the Central Statistical Ofﬁce of
Poland), about 12% of people were eligible to social security sup-
port, and about 7% of people had incomes below the ofﬁcial level of
subsistence.
What is controversial or simply incomprehensible is the
appearance on a large scale of opinions which are extremely critical
and ill-founded.
Let me present four of them from among the most popular and
the most extreme:
(a) The initial so-called shock therapy was truly a “shock
without therapy”.
This assessment is not based on facts. The liberalisation of prices
had to be implemented quickly, but it did not include all prices;
about 10% of prices remained regulated. The rate of inﬂation was
reduced gradually; the initial goale 1% or less per month at the end
of 1990 was not achieved until 10 years later. The ﬁscal policy was
not restrictive either. All throughout the transformation, except for
1990, budget deﬁcits have been substantial and in a few years
(2009 and 2010) very big. Social transfers were for many years very
high and privatisation slow.
Some critics, when talking about the “shock”, refer to a big
decline in real wages in 1990. Indeed, according to GUS data, they
were 26.7% lower in comparison with the level in 1989. However,
1988 saw an excessive increase in real wages. In comparison with
their level in 1987, the decline amounted only to 7.7%.
Table 1
GDP per capita (current purchasing power parity with reference to the USA).
Data based on G. Roland, Transition in Historical Perspective, May 6e7 2014 Conference Transition in Perspective, Budapest.
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excessively liberal and insufﬁciently solidarity minded;
This assessment is not based on facts either. The basic facts
include a high, and in the ﬁrst years even very high, relation of old
age and disability pensions to average wages, and an initially large
and later fast growing number of old age and disability pensioners.
The average pensionwithin the Social Insurance Fund (FUS) system
rose in relation to the average wage from about 50% before 1989 up
to 65% in 1990 and to 75,6% in 1991. This relation remained at the
level of 70e73% in the period of 1992e1994, and gradually declined
to the level of 65% in1998. In the period of transformation Poland
introduced on a large scale the so-called bridging pensions, pen-
sions for farmers and sickness pensions. Moreover, in practice a low
retirement age was retained. As a result, a joint number of old age
and disability pensioners of all kinds rose from the level of about 7
million in 1989 to about 9.5 million 10 years later. GUS research
conﬁrms that the lowest standard of living is experienced not by
the old age and disability pensioners but by young families, in
particular those with many children.
(c) Privatisation was accompanied by scams, primarily in favour
of people privileged by the former communist partyThis assessment ignores the facts which positively differentiate
Poland from such countries as Russia or Ukraine. The state sector
really shrank quickly, but primarily due to the decline in employ-
ment and production of companies, and not as a result of bank-
ruptcy or privatisation of these companies. Empirical research
proves that the privatisation of large companies was slow and, as a
rule, transparent, usually through public auctions. As I have already
remarked, in Poland there was a unique phenomenon, not to be
found in the other countries undergoing the transformation: a very
rapid increase in the number and size of brand new private com-
panies. This explains one of the paradoxes of the Polish trans-
formation, namely fast privatisation of the economy despite slow
privatisation of companies (Dabrowski et al., 2001).
(d) Transformation destroyed a large part of the Polish industry
This assessment is correct with regard to the period 1990e1991.
In 2013 the industrial output (manufacturing and mining) in con-
stant prices was 2.5 times higher than in 1989, and about 3.7 times
higher than in 1991. There was a change in the composition of in-
dustrial production in the right direction: the extraction of raw
materials shrank while the production and export of processed
goods, including high tech goods, grew many times.
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From among many achievements mentioned, I would consider
two to be the most important: ﬁrstly the creation, nearly from
scratch and relatively quickly, of a thriving sector of new private
companies and, secondly, the introduction of legal and institutional
reforms of the market economy, which together with other things,
enabled Poland to join the European Union in 2004.
A large success of the economic policy includes also the avoid-
ance of a crisis in the ﬁnancial sector (banks, investment and pension
funds, insurance companies and stock exchanges) and no open crisis
in public ﬁnance. Poland belongs to a small group of countries which
have managed to avoid such crises in the last 25 years. A consider-
able success in the real sphere has been the attraction of foreign
direct investment to the export sector (processing industry) and to
services (banks, large retail business, telecommunications and hotel
industry). . These investments were relatively modest, as in the
period 1995e2008 they accounted for about 10% of all investments.
However, due to their large concentration in the formerly neglected
economic sectors, their impact on the development of exports and
the quality of services has been crucial.
The local government reform also proved to be a great success.
As expected, it released a large capital of entrepreneurship at a
regional level. Probably partly due to this reform, since 2004 the
absorption of EU funds has been relatively high for infrastructure
investments, which is an essential area for the development of the
country. Finally, thanks to a strong expansion of higher education,
therewas a rise in the number of specialists with new qualiﬁcations
in deﬁcit areas, such as management, linguistics, ﬁnance or infor-
mation technology.
6. Making up for the development backwardness: why only
moderately fast?
According to the OECD estimates, in 2013 Poland's GDP was 2.3
times higher than in 1989. The average GDP growth rate in Poland
in the years 1989e2013, of about 4% annually, is not particularly
high in comparison with the rate achieved by emerging markets in
South-East Asia since 1950. A few Polish governments formulated
the achievement of a GDP growth rate up to 6% annually as their
strategic goal. The implementation of such a goal would require a
considerable rise in Poles' employment activity, which at present is
about 10% lower than in the most developed part of EU, as well as
an increase in the investment rate by about 10% of GDP from the
present level of about 20%. Economists knowwhat economic policy
(social policy, taxation policy, euro adoption) is necessary to ach-
ieve such changes in the value of these two key parameters.
However, attempts made by some governments to conduct such
policies have not been successful. Possibly, the necessary reforms
would have not been supported by the electorate.
7. The paradox of high innovativeness of the Polish economy
and the middle-income trap
Poland has still a number of serious problems to solve andmany
important reforms to introduce. The general goal of these reforms
should be to sustain the capability of further erosion of the income
and wealth gaps in relation to the world's most developed coun-
tries. A satisfactory progress in bridging these gaps depends on the
economic growth rate in the next 20e30 years being 3e5% annu-
ally, not below 3% annually.
It is necessary to present, in this context, a short theoretical
commentary on the mechanism of economic growth in the long
run. The economic growth rate in the short run depends on a
number of factors, e.g. on aggregate demand. A long-termeconomic growth rate per capita depends nearly entirely on the
rate of qualitative changes, such as technological and institutional
innovations as well as employees' skills. In well developed coun-
tries these changes result primarily from the innovativeness of the
entire world sector of R&D (research and development) and the
national level of education. In less developed countries, that is the
group of so-called catching-up countries to which Poland belongs,
their own innovative activity is marginal and will be insigniﬁcant
for yet a number of years, while the access to the latest innovation
will continue to be strongly limited. Technological changes in
economy within this group depend nearly entirely on the absorp-
tion of foreign innovations, primarily those easily accessible. This
absorption occurs mainly through the channel of investment ac-
tivity. In the case of high investment in relation to GDP, techno-
logical changes in the catching-up countries, in percentages terms,
may be for a certain period of time even several times bigger than in
the most developed countries. In Poland, as a result of trans-
formation, the access to the world resources of knowledge and
technology of older generations as well as the absorption capacity
of the economy have considerably increased. This explains the
paradox of a high innovativeness of the Polish economy and a low
innovativeness of the Polish R&D. However, with the GDP per
capita at a level of 50e70% of the most developed countries, further
fast technological progress of a catching-up country is becoming
more difﬁcult, as access to technologies of newer generations be-
comes necessary. At this level of development the process of
catching-up may be stopped. Economists speak about the so-called
middle-development trap or middle-income trap. Further progress
in gap bridging is possible, but the pace of catching up as a rule
becomes slower.
This pace may be sustained or the pace of the growth slowdown
may be reduced in two ways. One way is to strongly raise the
country's own innovation and absorption capacity, especially
directly by companies. The other is to care more about the factors
which increase the attractiveness of the country for investors from
the most developed countries. These factors include for example a
good quality infrastructure, high quality vocational and university
education, stable and entrepreneur-friendly legal and ﬁnancial
system, low political and exchange rate risk, low interest rates and
low inﬂation.
A document concerning Poland issued on 2 July 2014 by the
European Commission includes a detailed list of challenges and a
long list of necessary reforms. Let me just quote the assessment of
Poland's research and innovativeness:
„Poland is among the EU countries with the lowest level of R&D
expenditure and is one of the worst performers in broader
innovation indicators. Private R&D expenditure is especially
low. Low R&D spending is coupled with weak research and
innovation activity by companies and an insufﬁciently
innovation-friendly business environment. The innovation
support system in Poland has been risk-averse, based mostly on
grants, supporting technology absorption and transfer without a
big impact on genuinely new innovation. Existing tax incentives
for R&D are ineffective in promoting internal R&D by the private
sector and are used only by big companies.”
Economic integration favours the diffusion of everything that
contributes to a fast economic growth. Poland's escape from the
middle-growth trap will therefore also depend on the progress of
technological integration within the European Union. Meanwhile,
in recent years the risk of collapse of the best integrated EU part, i.e.
the euro zone, though not big so far, has grown. It is a worrying
phenomenon, particularly if as a result of this collapse the Union
itself becomes weak too. Such a weakening would result in the rise
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countries with regard to the ﬂow of goods, people, capital and
technology.
A stronger defence of national identity in the EU countries
comes in part in response to the integration progress perceived
sometimes as too rapid. In order to avoid the collapse of the euro
zone, there have to be reforms in the area of public ﬁnance and
banking. But the integration processes in the EU will certainly be
slow in the nearest future, as they have to includewhat is called the
European identity, i.e. an extremely complex social and cultural
sphere. An essential until now internal motive behind the devel-
opment of a strong economic integration, which is the avoidance of
war in Europe, is probably still valid. In the next decades this motive
may be reinforced by a growing trade competition, and perhaps
even the pressure arising from threats of different kind from two
new global economic and military superpowers: China and India,
the countries whose own populations are much bigger than the EU,
the USA, Canada and Japan jointly.
In its national interest, Poland should be active in the search of
recipes for the reduction of the risk of EU collapse down to zero, or
close to zero, and it should also itself, in cooperation with others,
undertake activities in favour of further economic integration.Acknowledgements
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